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Introduction 
The Korean peninsula has been an important regional and global conflict zone 
since the 20
th
 century. The division between the North and South, namely between the 
Democratic Peopleʼs Republic of Korea (henceforth referred to as DPRK or North 
Korea) and the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea), is with no doubt one main 
cause for destabilization in East Asia. Political developments in the peninsula have 
affected not only the region, but also the world as a whole. For instance, the Korean 
War ended up determining the course of the Cold War — serving as a parameter for the 
confrontation between the superpowers elsewhere — and the conditions for the use of 
nuclear weapons (Brites, 2011). Conversely, world events have also had influence over 
the developments in the region: The political trajectory of ROK and DPRK have 
oscillated according to the flow of political developments in the international system, 
from distension between the Soviet Union and the United States to the unipolarity of the 
1990s (Melchionna, 2011; Brites, 2011). 
Therefore, Brites (2011) affirms that any change in the status quo would most 
likely also alter not only the regional, but also the global balance of power as to its 
polarity and polarization, especially due to strong polarization of involved actors, such 
as the Peopleʼs Republic of China, Japan, Russia, and the United States. In addition to 
that, as Brites (2011) mentioned in the construction of possible scenarios that the 
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continuance of the division may engender the emergence of new identities either in the 
South or in the North, which could render a Korean reunification socially almost 
impossible or pointless.
2
 The Korean nation has been characterised by socio-cultural 
unity, but the fratricide war and the maintenance of the division have seriously shaken 
the Koreansʼ identity (Magno, Pitt & Brites, 2011). 
DPRK is deemed to be one of the most strongly ideologised contemporary 
states, where indoctrination is a part of the daily lives of every citizen, and, since 
ideology is a very important mechanism for waging war and also a vital aspect which 
determines identity (see e.g. Noesgaard et al, 2009; Larsen et al, 1995), this paper 
intends to analyse North Korean ideologies concerning war and violence. Thus, first we 
are going to review how ideologies are linked with organised violence. Siniša 
Maleševićʼs theory about the ideologisation of violence in modern times will be 
reviewed as well as Carl Schmittʼs concept of the political and his later update 
concerning partisanship. 
Following this review of theoretical approaches, there will be an analysis of the 
North Korean ideologies proper, focused on Songun (military-first) and on its 
counterpart the Chʼongdae (the gun philosophy) and what they stipulate with reference 
to violence and war. Juche, the other official North Korean ideology, will not be coped 
with, because it seems that Songun has replaced it as the main state ideology despite the 
official discourse (Kwon, 2003).
3
 Songun is the ideology of Kim Jong-Ilʼs regime, while 
Juche is more identified with Kim Il-Sungʼs (Gause, 2011). Even though the choice of 
Songun and Chʼongdae takes into account the pre-eminence that both give to 
prescriptions concerning war and violence, this paper does not intend to cover all North 
Korean ideologies and doctrines nor is it the intention to say that these two are the only 
relevant ones when it comes to the subject. 
                                                 
2
Polls show that the majority of young South Koreans (18 to 35 years old) sees DPRK as a distinct 
country with different culture and identity and, hence, the issue of reunification should be secondary in 
ROKʼs political agenda (Brites, 2011). 
3
Juche, on its most basic terms, means “self-reliance”; politically it prescribes economic, political and 
military independence (Lee, 2003). The concept has undergone several transformations since its inception 
and now it persists only minimally in the daily lives of the North Korean people (Kim, 2006). However, 
as Kim (2006) points out, it remains as a (sometimes vague) political guideline for the regime. 
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Thus, the paper is divided into two sections. The first one reviews the 
theoretical approaches of Schmitt and Malešević regarding ideology and war, starting 
with the former. The second is dedicated to descriptions of Songun and Chʼongdae and 
the analysis itself. A brief conclusion will, then, follow these two sections to examine 
the findings. 
 
Theoretical Approaches 
Malešević: ideology and war 
Malešević‟s interpretation of organized violence in modern times states that the 
Modern Age is characterized by an inherent discrepancy between the normative sphere, 
where human life is most valued (through ideologies) and violence abhorred, and the 
everyday practice, where killing happens at an unprecedented rate (Malešević, 2010). 
For him, Modernity‟s combination of systematic mass extermination and the moral 
importance of human life arises from the organization of societies and the proliferation 
of modern ideologies (Malešević, 2010).4 
In order to explain this dissonance, Malešević (2010) notes that organized 
violent actions require processes of collective mobilization and social mechanisms of 
justification. Ideologies — defined by him as “a universal social process through which 
individual and collective agents articulate their beliefs, values, ideas and actions” in 
order to articulate “blueprints for the transformation of the existing reality” (Malešević, 
2010: 130, 82) — fill this gap, working as powerful mobilisers and legitimisers of social 
action. Modernity provided a key ideological transformation: State authority was no 
longer based on divine grounds, but rather through abstract values such as justice, 
equality, liberty and others (Malešević, 2010). Therefore, it created an environment 
leaning to an intensive proliferation of ideologies fighting for the hearts and minds of 
citizens (Malešević, 2010). 
                                                 
4
Concerning the modern bureaucratization of societies, Malešević (2010) states that Modernity allows for 
a more potent organizational means for violence with structural rationalization of the entire society, while 
violence is externalized and becomes a rational means to achieve an end. 
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Within this context, Malešević (2010) develops the concept of “centrifugal 
(mass-scale) ideologisation”, which means a significantly wider proliferation of 
ideological discourses with strong popular resonance radiating from the centre of a 
particular social organization such as the state. These ideological discourses justify 
waging war against others. Warfare is, then, underpinned by an uncompromising 
conflict of values which states that war has to be won at any cost regardless of the 
number of casualties (Malešević, 2010). These ideologies, as a by-product of 
Modernity, aim at a better society (more just and rational), and, therefore, any 
opposition to them may be interpreted as irrational, deliberately unjust or even evil — 
and with evil there can be no compromise (Malešević, 2010). And, as he puts it himself: 
“Violence feeds off ideological doctrines that are capable of reconciling inclusion with 
exclusion, fairness with discrimination, equity with bigotry, and universalist humanist 
ethical principles with the mass slaughter of other human beings” (Malešević, 2010: 
83). 
Malešević presents historical examples of centrifugal ideologisation for the 
purposes of war-making. According to him, European states used the ideas of Social 
Darwinism to mobilize and justify colonialism, for instance the French (and Portuguese) 
mission civilisatrice (Malešević, 2010). In addition to that, he also quotes the two World 
Wars, which were also heavily conditioned by ideological struggles, besides 
geopolitical considerations. During the first, an ideological image of a unified nation 
was created to fight the adversaries and mobilize populations.
5
 As for the second, states 
mobilized their entire societies for war and presented uncompromising ideological 
projects — such as fascism, liberal democracy and state socialism — in a struggle for 
the preservation of humanity (Malešević, 2010). Yet, both were the bloodiest armed 
conflict to happen in human history, despite the ideologies‟ deep commitment to human 
life. 
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Image is a subjective knowledge about an object, how one thinks about it (Boulding, 1956). It can be 
different from objective information, but it is still important because behaviour depends on the image 
(Boulding, 1956). As Lee (2012) puts it, if the majority of the population of a country shares the same 
image of another one, their perception becomes a political reality, regardless of objectivity. Thus, 
ideology provides images for political action. 
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Malešević (2010) argues that this reconciliation — the view that all human 
beings are of equal moral worth, and that their life is precious, with warfare and mass 
exterminations — emerges through the denial of humanity to the enemy. This 
dehumanisation of the enemy serves the purpose of delegitimising their actions and to 
allocate them among beings of less worth than those of the human race (Malešević, 
2010). This view is also shared by Schmitt (2004), who argues that this happens 
because broad abstract concepts such as justice, progress and humanity are potent 
ideological devices that allow for one side of the conflict to dehumanise the enemy: 
They have to consider the other side as entirely criminal and inhuman, as 
totally worthless. Otherwise they are themselves criminal and inhuman. The 
logic of value and its obverse, worthlessness, unfolds its annihilating 
consequence, compelling ever new, ever deeper discriminations, 
criminalizations, and devaluations to the point of annihilating all of unworthy 
life (Schmitt, 2004: 67). 
In other words, “[t]he adversary is thus no longer called an enemy but a 
disturber of peace and is thereby designated to be an outlaw of humanity” (Schmitt, 
2007: 79). 
Finally, in the specific context of the modern nation-state, Malešević (2010) 
states that these social orders are able to enforce their coercive power anywhere in its 
territory and ideologically mobilize and legitimize this power. States have an internally 
shared perception among their societies that their nation is morally and ideologically 
right whose actions are universally justifiable (Malešević, 2010). However, during 
wartime the actions of their entire societies are governed by a single purpose, which is 
dictated by an ideology, opening the path to mobilization and justification (Malešević, 
2010). 
In sum, Malešević sees modern ideologies as tools for justification and 
mobilisation for warfare. Because they consider themselves rational and aim at a better 
society, they leave space open for interpretations that any opposition to them is 
irrational and backwards. Despite cherishing human life and dignity, discourses are 
developed by ideologies to justify killings, saying that those that are killed are “lesser 
humans”, whose life is of lesser worth. They provide an image in which the enemy is 
less human. In Modernity, ideologies emanate from the centre of social organisations 
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and have strong popular acceptance, causing what he names “centrifugal ideologisation” 
— opening the path for widespread mobilisation and legitimisation of war —, and this 
is the reason why it is the bloodiest epoch of human history. 
 
Carl Schmitt: war within the political 
In his “The Concept of the Political” Schmitt (2007) aims to define the distinct 
features of the political, considering that it does not equate with statehood, and in this 
attempt he develops a theory that may be applied to sociological studies of war and 
organized violence. For him, the unique characteristic of political actions and motives is 
that they can be reduced to a friend and enemy distinction. It is the utmost degree of 
unity or dissociation of human groupings, which determines whether conflict is possible 
in extreme cases. This friend-enemy distinction does not have to draw upon other 
distinctions, such as moral or economic ones, and only actual participants of a 
determined group can correctly determine it. 
Joas (2003) notices that this ultimate distinction does not mean that all politics 
is struggle, but that the underlining delimitation from others and the possibility of a 
conflict with them is central to the constitution of a political entity. Therefore, this 
possibility of war is inherent to the political sphere, even though awareness of it may be 
lost (Schmitt, 2007). Being ever present, it determines human action and thinking, 
creating, thus, political behaviour. War may not be desirable, ideal, common, or normal, 
but it has to remain a possibility to political groupings for as long as the concept of 
enmity remains valid (Schmitt, 2007; Joas, 2003). 
Therefore, in Schmitt‟s view, the friend-enemy distinction refers to the real 
chance of physical killing, whilst war is the existential negation of the enemy — the 
extreme consequence of enmity. Political entities are by its very nature the decisive ones 
regarding the friend-enemy distinctions, and the state‟s authority rests upon its political 
character, i.e. sovereignty consists exclusively in an ultimate ability to make decisions 
whether (and when) to wage war and about the state of emergency (Schmitt, 2007; Joas, 
2003). Schmitt (2007) adds that killing and war cannot be politically justified if there 
are no threats to the existence of political entity itself, but that once it does the political 
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association pushes all other societal realms and groupings (e.g. religion, economics) to a 
second rank. 
Consequently, any organized political group or entity contains within itself the 
possibility of war. The possibility of (organized) violence is in the essence of political 
human groupings. Therefore, war is intrinsically connected to the political life of the 
society. It is the result of the organization of humans into political entities. There can be 
no politics without a friend-enemy distinction, i.e. without the possibility of physical 
violence. 
Schmitt further developed his concept of the political through “The theory of 
the partisan”, in which he dealt with the emergence of irregular fighters (guerrilla, 
terrorism) since the 19
th
 century. Whereas in general war remains essentially contained, 
for the partisan it means a total war where the fight will last until the annihilation of the 
enemy, e.g. civil or colonial war (Schmitt, 2004). The partisan has an intense political 
character, since he or she is constantly dealing with the friend-enemy distinction in its 
extremes while fighting on a political front. In the common concept of the political, the 
enemy is invisible (up to a point) and the political struggle constructs a recognisable 
image of it (Žižek, 2002)6, but for the partisan, this image has already been provided 
and is very clear from the beginning, making it all the more extreme/fundamentalist. 
Drawing from Leninʼs writings the idea that revolutionary war is the only true 
war, since it originates from absolute enmity, Schmitt (2004) tells that partisanship 
knows no containment when it comes to violence. Precisely because the enemy is 
absolute, there is no chance of an intermediate peace (Schmitt, 2004). Deriving from 
Mao Zedong‟s ideas — who, according to him perfected the notion of partisanship —, 
Schmitt (2004) further states that partisanship is essentially characterized by this 
absolute real enmity, especially connected to the soil in dispute (anti-colonial and civil 
wars, for instance). In such conditions, only victory matters, similar to Clausewitz‟s 
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See footnote 4. 
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idea of absolute war — the extreme kind of war in which escalation of hostilities would 
be limitless
7
 — (Schmitt, 2004; Clausewitz, 1832; Echevarria, 2007). 
As a result, a political human grouping or entity of a partisan character would 
not only contain in itself the possibility of war, but it would be aware of it and handle it 
in its extremes. The members of such a grouping or entity would be immersed in the 
idea of conflict and organized violence. The likelihood of war would be very real, 
because enmity would also be absolute. There could be no agreement or partial peace, 
particularly when the partisanship of the entity or grouping in question is associated 
with a territory or soil. 
 
North Korean Ideologies and War 
Songun, the military-first ideology 
Songun, or the military-first politics, first came to the spotlight in the 1990s 
during the transitional period after the death of Kim Il-Sung. There are many 
divergences as to when it started, especially because the regimeʼs official narrative of 
facts has changed in the past two decades. Notwithstanding that, at first Songun was a 
political formula, which hinted at the modus operandi of Kim Jong-Il‟s rule, but at the 
onset of the 21
st
 century its ideas were elevated to the status of ideology (Miyeong, 
2009). 
Songun is an ideology in development that served as a new political strategy 
for the regime‟s survival (Kwon, 2003; Eberstadt, 2004). According to the North 
Korean perception, it was the ideological weakness of former communist countries — 
especially the armed forces depoliticisation — and their poor military capacities that led 
them to demise. North Korea deemed itself as the vanguard against American imperial 
power during the Cold War. As a consequence, when it ended, Pyongyang felt it was 
left alone in a unipolar world order ruled by the U.S. (Kwon & Chung, 2012). 
Therefore, Songun means to distinguish the DPRK from the Soviet Union (USSR) and 
other communist countries, the same way that Juche, the state ideology before Songun, 
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Clausewitzʼs concept is, however, only theoretical, because the idea of absolute war in reality is 
inconceivable and illogical (Clausewitz, 1832). 
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was used to differentiate the country from the USSR and China during the Cold War 
(Kwon & Chung, 2012). 
The theory of Songun states that the army is the pillar of revolution and its 
main driving force. Moreover, according to it, the socialist revolution is strongly based 
on correct thoughts and ideological dispositions. Consequently, there is a moral 
imperative to maintain it, which stands above economic welfare and growth. Hence, 
Songun prioritizes the power of ideology over production forces, contradicting the 
principles of Marxism and historical materialism, which were considered outdated by 
Kim Jong-Il, because the 21
st
 century has many different conditions in comparison to 
the time of their creation (Miyeong, 2009; Kwon & Chung, 2012). 
The main objective of Songun is the maintenance of the revolution, which can 
be primarily understood as the struggle against imperialist forces instead of fighting 
capitalism. The main imperialist forces trying to prevent the Korean independence are 
the Japanese and the Americans in the North Korean view. Drawing from that, Byman 
& Lind (2010) affirm that xenophobia against Americans and Japanese alike, plus those 
“contaminated by association” — i.e. South Koreans —, justifies Songun, because the 
official North Korean propaganda denigrates and dehumanizes U.S. and Japanese 
citizens and soldiers. Kang (2012) corroborates that anti-Americanism is pivotal for the 
ideology of Songun and adds that this sentiment has been used as a mechanism for 
social integration around the ideology. 
In fact, Kim Jong-Il (2000) declared that the Korean People‟s Army (KPA) 
equals the party (Workers‟ Party), the state and the people. Effectively, this means that 
Songun asks of the North Korean people to embrace and become the army, because it is 
the only way that they can safeguard their independence. Rodong Sinmun
8
 (2013) also 
states that the army-people unity is paramount for the conflict against imperialist forces 
and that the people should love their soldiers as their dearest ones and help them in any 
way possible. Moreover, the people “depend on strong revolutionary armed forces 
because revolution requires confrontations of power between revolutionaries and 
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 Rodong Sinmun is the newspaper of the Workersʼ Party of Korea and is considered a source of official 
positions and views on several subjects. 
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counter-revolutionaries” (Miyeong, 2009: 187). The society ought to learn from the 
KPA‟s soldiers and emulate their revolutionary spirit and fighting style. Koh (2010) 
argues that Songun, then, elevates the military both as a function and as an organization: 
An enabler of the revolutionary struggle — defending the country from imperialists —, 
whose internal values of loyalty, revolutionary spirit, cohesiveness and esprit de corps 
should be copied by the society towards the maintenance of the revolution. The entire 
country has to be armed with ideas and willing to die to defend the country and the 
supreme leader (Koh, 2010). 
Despite this logic of the army being at the forefront of revolutionary struggle, 
Fendler (2009) contends that Songun is not aggressive, but rather protective, serving for 
domestic political purposes. Zerpa (2011) agrees with this opinion and further claims 
that Songun is an instrument for defence and peace: dissuasion from external 
interference and assurance of an independent development. The ideology states that the 
KPA is the nation‟s ideological vanguard and that it should be central in all realms of 
the North Korean citizens‟ lives, and these prescriptions actually have advanced very 
concrete political objectives of Kim Jong-Il (Kim, 2006). The political system 
underwent several changes, including constitutional ones, after the death of Kim Il-
Sung, to increase the role of the armed forces in politics. For instance, the main political 
position of the country is now a military rank, which oversees the political bodies.
9
 By 
the time of the implementation of these changes, Kim Jong-Il‟s objective was a rupture 
with the past, trying to detach the army from the economic crisis which happened in the 
mid-1990s and to guarantee the loyalty of the armed forces to his government. 
 
Ch’ongdae, the gun philosophy 
In spite of the attempt to differentiate Kim Jong-Il‟s government from his 
father‟s, the regime still needed to create a sense of continuity, because the succession 
legitimacy basis is linked to the perpetuation of an ideological line stemming from his 
father (Armstrong, 2003). Hence, the idea that Songun was actually a creation from Kim 
                                                 
9
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the party lost importance in the everyday lives of North Korean 
citizens nor in the government, neither that the military dominates it (Kim, 2006). 
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Il-Sung or, in other words, a tradition in the family, started appearing on the media and 
the arts. There was an alteration in the official narratives of Kim Il-Sung‟s family to 
adapt Songun within Juche and the North Korean history as a whole. Stories of how 
Kim Il-Sung received two guns as a gift from his father and how he gave his son, Kim 
Jong-Il, his own pistol became more recurring. The justification for those gestures is 
that “When you fight with an enemy who happens to have a knife in his hand, you need 
a knife yourself to fight and win the duel” and that “armed struggle was the supreme 
form of struggle for national independence” (Kwon & Chung, 2012: 83). Consequently, 
it generated a connection between Il-Sungʼs and Jong-Il‟s governments through ideas: 
The father recognized the importance of the gun for the revolution and the son 
implemented his father‟s ideas through Songun. Therefore, the notion that guns are the 
“closest friends of a revolutionary” upholds this family-rooted political heritage and 
delivers the premises and meanings of Songun, bridging old and new forms of partisan 
politics in DPRK (Kwon & Chung, 2012). 
However, this new narrative gave rise to a new philosophy which helps sustain 
the Songun ideology: Ch’ongdae, or the “gun philosophy”.10 It advocates that the 
“revolution is pioneered, advanced, and completed depending on the gun” (O, 2003: 4 
apud Miyeong, 2009: 193). According to the editorial of Rodong Sinmun on January 1
st
, 
2000, “[t]o attach great importance to arms is a strategic line that should always be held 
fast to as long as imperialism remains and the revolution goes on”. War potential would 
be the first requirement for the society to carry on the revolution and the gun is the most 
effective means of violence for the ideological rearmament of the population, according 
to the philosophy (Miyeong, 2009). 
Moreover, Ch’ongdae asserts that the individuals are responsible for their own 
moral-ideological purity, discipline and perfection, including of the body (O, 2003; 
Kwon & Chung, 2012). In this sense, Kang (2012) affirms that it in effect gives rise to 
an organic integration of the person‟s body and the nation. Through discipline and 
obedience by the people, the regime is able to exert its power over them, similar to 
                                                 
10Ch’ongdae is also known as the “barrel-of-a-gun philosophy”, “gun-valuing philosophy”, or 
“philosophy of the firearms”. Sometimes it is also referred to as a doctrine.  
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Foucault‟s idea of the diffusion of modern power through disciplinary control of 
individual bodies (Kang, 2012; e.g. Foucault, 1991). Furthermore, it speaks to the 
individuals within the community about their role in Songun and the centrality of the 
army, or “the place of individuals in a societal unity constituted in the image of an 
army” (Kwon & Chung, 2012: 88). Consequently, individuals ought to see themselves 
as guns for the revolution, culminating in “an absolute moral unity between the army 
and the people, as well as a practical and spiritual unity between the person and the 
gun” (Kwon & Chung, 2012: 88-89). Only when this happens and the revolution 
succeeds there will be true peace, i.e. peace comes through Ch’ongdae. 
Kwon & Chung (2012) tell of two different types of Ch’ongdae: the exemplary 
and the popular. On the one hand, the first consists of the heritage of armed 
revolutionary struggle against colonial (Japan) and post-colonial (the U.S.) imperialism. 
The popular Ch’ongdae, on the other hand, denotes the entirety of the social forces in 
North Korea, which are united in the task of defending the exemplary Ch’ongdae with 
their own lives, including through both nuclear capabilities and collective human 
efforts. The authors further explain that the first protects the whole nation, while the 
latter exists to defend the integrity of the first: They support one another. In the end, 
Ch’ongdae regards the revolutionary violence as the apex of a truly meaningful political 
life (Kwon & Chung, 2012) — either in the exemplary form, celebrating the wars 
against Japan and the U.S., or in the popular one, where the greatest task of a person is 
(to be willing to sacrifice him- or herself) to protect the regime —. 
Furthermore, Kwon & Chung (2012) distinguish two kinds of war in 
Ch’ongdae, namely the revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary ones. This division 
categorizes violence morally into two realms: the progressive, just, and revolutionary; 
and the counter-revolutionary, unjustified, reactionary (Kwon & Chung, 2012). The 
revolutionary violence is popular, while the other is unpopular. Hence, violence is 
justified only in the case when it is perpetrated by popular masses in the service of 
revolution and political self-determination: All other instances of violence and war are 
abhorred (Kwon & Chung, 2012). Ch’ongdae, in this context, is a token of the 
permanent importance of the means of this justified force, referring to all resources 
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necessary for it, be they animate or inanimate (Kwon & Chung, 2012). Moreover, the 
authors also note that violence is not only physical or mechanical, but — very 
importantly — it can be moral and ideological as well. 
 
Analysis 
North Korea is a heavily ideologised state, where indoctrination is a part of the 
daily lives of every citizen. The country is almost a perfect example of the centrifugal 
ideologisation mentioned by Malešević since there is a proliferation of an ideological 
discourse (Songun and Ch’ongdae, among others) radiating from the state. As such, 
elements found in the theoretical approaches of Schmitt and Malešević can be found in 
the North Korean ideologies of Songun and Ch’ongdae. 
Schmitt stated that the unique feature of the political is the constant possibility 
of war and violence due to the friend-enemy distinction. Furthermore, in partisan 
entities and groupings war is not only a remote possibility of which its members are 
unaware, but it is ever present in the everyday lives. This occurs because partisanship 
deals with absolute enmity and the extremes of the distinction. In this sense, it seems 
clear that the North Korean state is a partisan one, because it is constantly dealing with 
the possibility of war and handling it in its extremes. Songun and Ch’ongdae facilitate 
that the North Korean citizens become immersed in the idea and possibility of an armed 
conflict. 
Concerning the friend-enemy distinction of the partisan state, Ch’ongdae 
makes it clear that violence and war are only justified when they are revolutionary and 
Songun distinguishes towards whom such violence should be directed: imperialist 
forces, namely Japan and the United States. As Kang (2012), Byman & Lind (2010) 
highlighted, anti-Americanism and xenophobia against Japan and the U.S. are a part of 
Songun. Therefore, from the beginning the image of the enemy is very clear: Both 
countries are absolute real enemies of North Korea. This condition can also be applied 
to other countries which are “contaminated by association” with the former. In other 
words, South Korea could also be seen as an absolute real enemy through the lenses of 
Songun and Ch’ongdae. 
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In a point similarly raised by Schmitt and Malešević, there can be no 
agreement with the absolute enemy or with those that oppose the state ideology. This 
seems to be the case presented by Songun and Ch’ongdae. In the form of state 
propaganda U.S. and Japanese citizens are dehumanised — as predicted by Malešević 
and Schmitt —, and it makes the case of war easier to be legitimised in the country for 
they are seen as human of less worth than the North Koreans: unworthy criminals 
and/or beasts. 
Malešević also raised the point that ideologies serve as for both mobilisation 
and legitimisation. It is noticeable that Ch’ongdae and Songun also serve these 
purposes. The first stipulates preparation for war and readiness to die for the country 
(and for the ideology) as moral imperatives of the citizens. It also states that the 
individuals ought to discipline themselves in order to become more “morally-
ideologically pure” and fit (for the army) so as to fully develop the countryʼs war 
potential. On its turn, Songun instructs the citizens to emulate the KPA in their lives, 
that they have to become the army to protect the country — alluding to the telluric 
aspect in partisanship raised by Schmitt — and the revolution. In accordance to 
Maleševićʼs theoretical approach, the North Korean state has used both Songun and 
Ch’ongdae as legitimisers and mobilisers of/for war. Likewise, Kang (2012) describes 
the North Korean societal system as a military war system in which all people are 
partisans militarily and mentally prepared to cope with war and where society and the 
military is integrated into one. 
In sum, Ch’ongdae and Songun present all elements raised by the theoretical 
approaches of Schmitt and Malešević. They deal with the possibility of war and identify 
absolute real enemies of the North Korean state, i.e. Japan and the U.S. plus those 
associated with them. Both ideologies also constantly mobilise and legitimise violence 
against these enemies, even if just for defensive purposes. Similar to what Kang (2012) 
affirms, their continuous reminder of war is a social mechanism to create mass armies 
and to defend the country against the imperialist threat of the United States and Japan 
(and their associates). By dehumanising them and for being absolute enemies, there can 
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be no peace between DPRK and them, according to the theoretical approaches of 
Schmitt and Malešević. 
 
Conclusion 
In the review of the theoretical approaches of Schmitt and Malešević, it 
became noticeable that both authors share similar views concerning ideology, war and 
violence. Schmitt affirms that all things political have the same unique characteristic of 
the friend-enemy distinction. Political human groupings and entities always have within  
themselves the possibility of war and violence against their enemies. Physical violence 
is intrinsic to politics as such, even if inconspicuous. On Schmittʼs update to include 
partisanship to his concept of the political, he included situations in which ideologies 
play a greater role. Partisan entities and their members deal with the friend-enemy 
distinction in its extremes and are aware of the possibility of war, because they deal 
with absolute real enmity. It is precisely because of that that there can be no 
compromising stances: There can be no agreement with the absolute enemy. 
Malešević presents a similar case on his quest as to why Modernity is the most 
violent age of human history. Besides bureaucratisation, he sees ideologies and the 
process of centrifugal ideologisation as an important factor for that. He argues that 
modern ideologies serve as legitimisers and mobilisers of warfare, because they are able 
to combine appreciation of human life with war and killing. The possibility of violence 
is intrinsic to them, since any opposition may be considered irrational and evil and, 
therefore, should be extirpated. This is the main point of convergence of Malešević and 
Schmitt, for both see how modern ideologies, based on broad values, can justify war 
and violence. 
All of the features mentioned in the theoretical approaches of the authors found 
correspondence in the North Korean case. Songun and Ch’ongdae deal with enmity in 
extremes and are aware of the possibility of war. Even if just for defensive purposes, 
they call for revolutionary violence (any other kind of violence would be morally 
wrong) against colonialist and imperialist forces, i.e. the United States and Japan, 
exemplifying the telluric character of partisanship mentioned by Schmitt. Songun and 
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Ch’ongdae both serve the purpose of constant mobilisation and legitimisation of war in 
North Korea; the latter especially handles with the preparedness for war through 
“moral-ideological purity” and bodily perfection. This way the country is always ready 
for war. Moreover, as both Schmittʼs and Maleševićʼs approaches would predict 
concerning extreme ideologisation, these North Korean ideologies do not seem to be 
open for compromise, exactly because they deal with absolute enmity and dehumanize 
their enemies. 
Hence, concerning the case studied, it becomes important to assess whether the 
theoretical approaches and the ideologies match reality in North Korea. How does the 
society behave with regards to those ideologies and to the recurrent low-scale military 
confrontations with the South? In addition to that, anthropological studies seem also 
necessary to evaluate the impacts of Songun and Ch’ongdae on the North Korean 
citizensʼ everyday lives. Moreover, it is specially necessary to further analyse whether 
these ideologies have indeed already developed a new identity for the North Korean 
people — which would make it more difficult for a reunification — or if it is still just a 
political tool with no deeper roots in the society. 
If the North Korean ideologies have in fact created a new identity within the 
society, from the standpoint of the theories and the prescriptions of Songun and 
Ch’ongdae, a hindrance to reunification would seem to take shape, since they do not 
allow for compromising stances with the enemies, which include those states associated 
with Japan and the U.S., for instance South Korea itself. If there can be no peace with 
South Korea, in the long term this could mean the development of a new identity 
accustomed to a permanent and real possibility of war, which would obstruct 
reunification and maintain the status quo or worse, lead to a war very close to the 
Clausewitzʼs ideal type of absolute war. 
There are no doubts that the situation in the Korean peninsula is of utmost 
importance for world affairs, especially when it comes to its stability. The North Korean 
ideologies studied in this paper pose as possible sources of instability for they preach on 
war preparedness (even if just defensively). Alone, Songun and Ch’ongdae may lead to 
a dark path of war at any point in time. Therefore, further studies on their interplay with 
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other North Korean ideologies and the shared identity with South Korea are needed to 
see DPRKʼs real ideological predisposition to war. Additionally, special attention ought 
to be given to any change in the official discourse and possible transformations of the 
ideological doctrines with Kim Jong-Unʼs ascension to power and to how they change 
North Koreaʼs stance towards war and violence. 
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Resumo 
Este artigo analisa as ideologias da Coreia do Norte em matéria de guerra e violência. 
Para isso, em primeiro lugar, há uma revisão teórica de como as ideologias estão 
relacionados com a violência organizada. A teoria de Siniša Maleševićs sobre a 
ideologização da violência na Modernidade é revisada, bem como o conceito de Carl 
Schmitts de política e sua atualização posterior sobre partidarismo. Após as abordagens 
teóricas, há uma análise das ideologias norte-coreanos adequadas, com foco em Songun 
(ideologia militar em primeiro lugar) em contrapartida a Ch‟ongdae (a filosofia da 
arma) e o que elas estipulam com referência à violência e à guerra. Na conclusão, 
afirma que tanto Songun e Ch'ongdae lidam com inimizades nos extremos e estão 
conscientes da possibilidade de uma guerra envolvendo a Coréia do Norte. Mesmo que 
apenas para fins defensivos, eles pedem pela violência revolucionária. Eles também 
servem ao propósito de mobilização constante e legitimação da guerra no país: Desta 
forma, ele está sempre pronto para a guerra. Além disso, como ambas as abrodagens 
teóricas de Schmitt e Malešević poderiam prever, estas ideologias norte-coreanos não 
parecem estar abertas para o comprometimento, exatamente porque eles lidam com 
inimizade absoluta e desumanizar seus inimigos. 
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Abstract 
This article analyses North Korean ideologies concerning war and violence. For that, 
first there is a theoretical review of how ideologies are linked with organised violence. 
Siniša Maleševićʼs theory about the ideologisation of violence in Modernity is reviewed 
as well as Carl Schmittʼs concept of the political and his later update concerning 
partisanship. Following the theoretical approaches, there is an analysis of the North 
Korean ideologies proper, focused on Songun (military-first ideology) and on its 
counterpart the Chʼongdae (the gun philosophy) and what they stipulate with reference 
to violence and war. In the conclusion, it states that both Songun and Ch‟ongdae deal 
with enmity in extremes and are aware of the possibility of war involving North Korea. 
Even if just for defensive purposes, they call for revolutionary violence. They also serve 
the purpose of constant mobilisation and legitimisation of war in the country: This way 
it is always ready for war. Moreover, as both Schmittʼs and Maleševićʼs theoretical 
approaches would predict, these North Korean ideologies do not seem to be open for 
compromise, exactly because they deal with absolute enmity and dehumanize their 
enemies. 
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